210. See McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1262 n.21 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Of course, we assume that [the applicant] will obtain the best possible reproduction of the documents to which he is entitled.”); Giles v. United States Dep`t of Justice, No. 00-1497, folio op. cit. 5 (D.D.C. 4 June 2001) (accepting that the Agency provided the applicant with the “best available copies” even though it claimed they were “illegible”); see also FOIA Update, Vol. XVI, No.
3, p. 5 (advising agencies that “before providing a FOIA applicant with a photocopy of a document that is a bad copy or is not fully legible”, they should “make reasonable efforts to seek a better copy of a record that could be used to create a better photocopy for the applicant”). 192. See FOIA Update, vol. XII, point 2, page 5 (“OIP Guidance: Procedural Rules Under the D.C. Circuit`s Oglesby Decision”) (recognizing that “the effective management of the FOIA depends quite heavily on the mailing of copies of documents to be disclosed to FOIA applicants”); see also Comer v. IRS, No. 97-76329, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16268, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. 30, 1999) (noting that although “foia does not require authorities to provide members of the public with information that they themselves can access. The Court is lost. why [the defendant] refuses to simply copy this information and send it to the plaintiff as long as he is willing to pay for the copies”); Accord Presidential FOIA Memorandum, reprinted in FOIA Update, Vol. XIV, No. 3, p. 3 (“[A]gencies should treat requests for information. [without] unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles.
»). But see Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Dep`t of the Interior, No. 03-1192, 2004 WL 842374, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2004) (holding that if an organization retains duplicate copies of a document requested under the FOIA, it is only required to provide such a copy in its response to the request, as “it would be illogical and unnecessary to require an organization to provide multiple copies of the same document”). In most cases, the reuse of information published under the law is dealt with under the RPSI. The PSR applies to most, but not all, public authorities; For example, universities are generally not covered by RPSI, although their libraries are. For authorities that are not subject to the RPSI, there are certain provisions on re-use in the law, but they only apply to one type of information, namely datasets.
Under these terms, if you share a recording that is a “relevant copyrighted work” and you are the sole owner of the copyright or database rights, you must publish it under a license that allows it to be reused. The licenses for use for this are set out in Article 45 of the Code of Conduct for Registrations. If the dataset can be reused for free, the corresponding license is usually the Open Government license. (aa) the right of that person to contact the Head of the Agency within a time limit set by the Head of the Agency, which shall be at least 90 days after the date of such an adverse finding; and 95. See, for example, 28 C.F.R. § 16.4(a) (referring to the “deadline” that the Department of Justice uses “normally” and stating that “if a different date is used, the [department] must inform the applicant of that date”). 98. Cf. z. B. Poll v. United States Office of Special Counsel, No.
99-4021, 2000 WL 14422, at *5 n.2 (10th Jan. 10, 2000) (recognizing that the FOIA does not require an organization to “create documents or opinions in response to an individual`s request for information” (cited hudgins v. IRS, 620 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1985)); Sorrells v. United States, Nos. 97-5586, 1998 WL 58080, to *1 (6th Cir. 6 February 1998) (noting that the Office is not required to compile documents that “contain a complete and legible signature”); Krohn v. Dep`t of Justice, 628 F.2d 195, 197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (provide that the Agency “shall not be compelled to make such [provisional records] as are necessary for the preparation of the information requested); Jones v.
Runyon, 32 F. Supp. 2d 873, 876 (N.D. W. Va. 1998) (concluding that “because the FOIA does not require [the Agency] to keep records”, “acted correctly in granting access to documents already established”), aff`d, 173 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Bartlett v. United States Dep`t of Justice, 867 F. Supp.
314, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (decision that the agency is not required to perform a handwriting analysis); see also FOIA UPDATE, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 5; cf. De Luca v. INS, No. 95-6240, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2696, to *2 (E.D. Pa.
Fable. 7, 1996) (having regard to the fact that, by simple administrative assessment, the Agency proposed to draw up a certificate attesting that it had no trace that the applicant was a naturalised citizen). But cf. Schladetsch v. HUD, No. 99-0175, 2000 WL 33372125, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2000) (“Because [the Agency] has admitted that it has in its databases the discrete information that [the applicant] searches, extracts and compiles, that the extraction and compilation of that data does not amount to the creation of a new data set.”), appeal deliberately dismissed, No.
00-5220 (D.C. Cir. 12 October 2000); Int`l Diatomite Producers, 1993 WL 137286, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 28 April 1993) (gives the agency the choice of creating a reactive list or modifying existing lists with reactive information); BFIA Update, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, pp. 5-6 (Reference to special legal obligations with regard to electronic file requests and disclosure format).
(i) Research data is defined as the recorded factual material generally accepted in the scientific community as necessary for the validation of research results, but not as one of the following: preliminary analyses, draft scientific articles, plans for future research, peer reviews or communication with colleagues. This “captured” material excludes physical objects (e.g., laboratory samples). Research data also does not include: (A) trade secrets, trade information, documents that must be kept confidential by a researcher until they are published, or similar information protected by law; and (B) personal, medical and similar information the disclosure of which would constitute a manifestly unjustified invasion of privacy, such as: Information that could be used to identify a specific individual in a research study. 91. See, for example, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Dep`t of Energy, No. 01-0981, 2004 WL 635180, at *21 (D.D.C.
31 March 2004) (“Because [the Agency] dies. Deadline, without informing [the applicant] of its intention, the court must conclude that the [Agency`s] search was inadequate. see also FOIA UPDATE, Vol. IV, No. 4, p. 14 (which, more than two decades ago, emphasized that “organizations should communicate the `deadlines` they used)); see McGehee, 697 F.2d to 1105 (noting that the Agency may conclude that it can “reasonably” use a “deadline” without informing the applicant accordingly).) 61. See, for example, North, 881 F.2d to 1096; Bright v. Attorney Gen.
John Ashcroft, 259 F. Supp. 2d 502, 503 & n.1 (E.D. La. 2003) (erroneous finding that Brady v. Maryland “requires” that information not disclosed by the FOIA under Exception 7(D) be disclosed to the plaintiff). But see United States v. United States Dist. Court, Cent.
Dist. of Cal., 717 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that the FOIA does not expand the scope of criminal investigations authorized under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Agunbiade, No. 90-CR-610, 1995 WL 351058, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 1995) (stating that a FOIA plaintiff “cannot use the law as a means of extending his right to discovery” in his criminal proceedings); Johnson v. United States Dep`t of Justice, 758 F. Supp. 2, 5 (D.D.C. 1991) (“Recours à Brady v. Maryland as a reason for the waiver of confidentiality. outside of the real role of the FOIA. »); Stimac v.
United States Dep`t of Justice, 620 F. Supp. 212, 213 (D.D.C. 1985) (“Brady v. Maryland. does not authorize the release of material under the FOIA. »); see Jones v FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 250 (6th Cir. 1994) (“FoiA`s Scheme of Exemptions does not curtail a plaintiff`s right to discovery in related non-FOIA litigation; but this right also does not allow a FOIA applicant to circumvent rules that restrict the disclosure of documents under the FOIA. »). 144. See Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 615-16 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); see also Gilmore v. NSA, No. 94-16165, 1995 WL 792079, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995) (noting that even after the Agency`s recent internal review of its foiA activities aimed at identifying and correcting deficiencies resulted in an increase in staff and the implementation of the “first in/first out” procedure, the Court concluded that it is “unlikely that [the Agency] will be able to process applications more quickly, because it must carry out a thorough scrutiny of sensitive documents, before disclosing the requested information”); Jimenez v. FBI, 938 F. Supp. 21, 31 (D.D.C. 1996) (“Given [the Agency`s] dual-track system and the large amount of documents expected to respond to the applicant`s request, the Court finds that [the Agency] exercised due diligence for a stay.”); Gilmore v. United States Dep`t of State, No.
95-1098, folio op. cit. to 27 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1996) (Conclude that, among other factors, “the recent and prolonged government shutdown provides sufficient evidence of exceptional circumstances”). But see Matlack, Inc. v. EPA, 868 F. Supp. 627, 633 (D. Del.
1994) (the decision on that agency`s response that it has a “long list of appeals against the Freedom of Information Act and is working as quickly as possible to resolve it,” without more, is simply not sufficient to prove “extraordinary circumstances”). See FOIA General Update, Volume XIV, No. 3, pp. 8-9 (discussion of possible solutions to the backlog problem); FOIA Update, Vol.